Looking for answers: Pre-war French training

Howdy,

I've been reading and wondering about French planning prior to the Great War.

Their warplan, Plan XVII, was an offensive warplan that included a double envelopment of Metz with the apparent intent of fighting and winning a battle of annihilation (and yes, the French planned to invade Belgium). Joffre, the French commander, attempted to implement this plan with the offensives in the Lorraine and in the Ardennes. The resulting Battle of the Frontiers was a disaster for the French Army.

I've been wondering about the content of pre-war French individual and unit training. I know the French had very limited training areas for conducting unit exercises. I know French tactical doctrine was immature - they did not have the concept of fire superiority. That is fire can allow maneuver by suppressing the enemy. I know individual infantry equipment was incomplete - soldiers did not have wire cutters or entrenching tools.

Why did the French believe they had a well-trained army?
Why did the French believe they could beat the Germans in open-field battles?

Their higher level planning, command and staff work was excellent. They mobilized faster than the Germans. Their command recognized the disaster as it occurred and revamped their operations.

Ponder on,

JAS
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Ardent DuPicq died in the Franco-Prussian war, cut down by German artillery while riding in front of his regiment to inspire them. His ideas, however, contained in his marvelous book, "Battle Studies" I believe provided some of the theoretical underpinning of French tactical thinking. The French take a lot of stick for the silliness of "les pantalons rouges" (sending troops into battle wearing red pants) and emphasizing "L'attaque a outrance" and elan and de-emphasizing firepower and its deplorable effects. Much of this comes from the second half of DuPicq's book, his predictions on future combat. Like many theorists, his logical extrapolations from some very real and concrete data led him to some remarkably silly conclusions, such as his insistence that cuirassier would be an important factor in future combat... But his book is well worth reading, because his analysis of ancient combat, and also Napoleonic and the fighting in the Crimea and Italy are outstanding, and in fine contrast to much of the absurd notions bandied about even to this day. Remember, the Great Wars that most thinking was developed from that armies tried to execute in 1914 were the wars of Napoleon. The American Civil War, the Crimean War, the Boer War, the Franco-Prussian War and the Russo-Japanese War were largely ignored as aberrations, or just ignored because the lessons were incompatible with the glory and pomp of peace time soldiering. Read it, if you can find a copy. You won't be disappointed.

Some basis for a faith

Well.... The last wars that France had fought had been colonial wars: North and Central Africa, Madagascar, IndoChina. All wars requiring good staff work in order to match troops with supplies and the enemy.
And note: all wars won by France.

But these wars did not require howitzere, wire cutters or entreching tools. Serious determimation was needed to break the will of the enemy. Similar situation in the UK, however the Boer War had revealed the need for small arms fire superiority and indirect fire support.

Viewed from the south side of the Channel, a leasson from the Boer War could have been a lack of determination in the attack, a tendency to slow down rather than to close and win with fight at close quarters - wait for support. The French had not had an logistical mightmare in the Crimean the British had and were probably not impressed their army and/or Staff work.

Even the (North) American Civil War could teach this ... untrained troops on both sides
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Best regards
Peter Kamp Nielsen

Chakoten
Danish Military Historical Society

There's a saying that since Napoleon, we are always ready for the war we fought last... Not totally untrue.

Interestingly, I noticed in the last few years a different approach to military thinking in France.

When I was talking about my interest in military history 10 years ago, I was seen at best as a weirdo. Now you can find more and more military history magazines and most people, although not interested, don't see it as a sign of mental disorder.

You also find more publications by professional officers and researchers. All insist on thinking the future with an open mind. Before, French officers weren't really encouraged to publish their thoughs. there's now even a specialized magazine with high quality professional articles available to the public.

The cold war pushed the US military to renew their thinking about war but it freezed french thinking because of the emphazise put on nuclear deterence. Maybe the trauma of WW2 and the subconcious association of war with nuclear armaggedon also put a taboo on talking about war in the public. The disapearence of both in people minds and the realization that new threats are at stake have changed perceptions...
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Francis Garnier

A link to "Battle Studies"

Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle
by Charles Jean Jacques Joseph Ardant du Picq

http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/gutbook/lookup?num=7294
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Best regards
Peter Kamp Nielsen

Chakoten
Danish Military Historical Society

Thank you, Peter. If you guys haven't read it, particularly if you have any interest in ancient battle, you owe it to yourself. As I said, it is a far better analysis of what was than what was to be. Preindustrial thinking met the industrial age in August, 1914, and the results were not pretty.

But his analysis of ancient battle, and battle in the age of Fredrick and Napoleon is marvelous. One of my favorites, "What is the purpose of volley fire?" Obviously, skirmish fire, or individual fire takes place when the shooter has his target lined up in his sights. Thus this fire tends to hit more often than volleys, that are unleashed on command, and the command is given regardless of whether any of the shooters have actually got a good sight picture. So what is the point? The point is to give the volley firers something to do with their hands while they are being fired at. Going through the drill focuses the mind, which otherwise would have time to dwell on the fact that bullets are whizzing past, or finding their mark among one's comrades, and the logical thing to do would be to get the hell out of there!

If you have ever seen the Lemaze birthing technique in practice you will understand what's going on. The mother is too busy counting, regulating her breathing, monitoring her muscle relaxation, and doing efflurage with her hands for the nerve messages to get to the brain telling her this is hurting like hell. They keep getting a busy signal. It actually works.

DuPicq was a very astute and skeptical analyst. He just didn't see into the future that no matter how good your morale might be, shrapnel won't be impressed. Or machineguns.

Howdy,

I was recently reading a forward to a memoir, that I found curious. It was written in 1930 by Edmonds, the fellow who wrote the British Official History. He made several comments that were most interesting:

1) He thought the British victors at both Mons & LeCateau.

2) "The retreat to the Seine and the battle of the Marne, as will be seen, were a test of marching discipline, and shooting rather than of fighting, and, better trained the Allies won."

I find both comments to be without merit. It highlights a problem with reading only English for military history. I've come to think the British have perpetrated a great fraud on history by their portrayal of the BEF in the Marne campaign.

Ponder on,

JAS
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Oh, why be so narrow minded? British military history has done more than give a distorted vision of the Marne campaign. The British have written extensively of every war they have been even peripherally involved in, and for the most part performed brilliantly (in their history, at least) in nearly every one of them. And of course, having been considerate enough to write in English, they have effected the way that Americans have perceived a lot of military history too. It is not just the French who have come off poorly in the world as seen in British military history! This is not to say, I might hasten to add, strictly a British phenomenon. American, Soviet, German and no doubt French history (haven't had much experience with the latter) all show the same sort of "objectivity!"

Howdy,

Robert Doughty in his award winning book on the French army in WW1, "Pyrrhic Victory," writes in his chapter on transforming the French army:

"Unaware of the mis-match between his army's capability and the challenges it would soon face but optimistic about the 'wholehearted support of Russia,' Joffre welcomed the prospect of war with Germany."

Ponder on,

JAS
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Wars always look like more fun from Headquarters...